Ajax Vs Manchester United-A Close Look At Ajax's System

Two clubs with illustrious pasts in the Champions League face off in the Europa league for a spot in the last 16. For Manchester United and its fans,playing on Thursday nights will be an unusual affair and with United chasing City to retain their Premier League title,one cant expect Ferguson to play his strongest side always. But as this weekend is an FA Cup weekend and with United already out of it,we may see a stronger than usual United side taking to the field in Amsterdam. Ajax on the other hand are struggling in the Eredivisie and their win over NAC Breda at the weekend was the first win after the winter break.

Formation

Frank De Boer usually sets his team in a 4-3-3 with Enoh as the deepest of the three midfielders,with the highly rated Christian Eriksen alongside him. Janssen,if fit will be the third midfielder for Ajax. Janssen was used as an deep lying playmaker earlier in the season,but then De Boer started playing Enoh and at times Anita purely as a holding mid. Usually Ajax builds from the back and the wing backs do push up forward quite a bit with Enoh dropping deeper to cover. Ajax's main worry at the moment is getting the ball to the front three,they generally enjoy a good amount of possession in their own half but struggle to split open defences. With someone like Christian Eriksen you expect to see defence splitting passes,but under Frank De Boer he doesn't look to get forward much and generally is involved in the initial build up play(In recent Eredivisie games i.e).

As i don't have access to Eredivisie stats,lets look back to the Champions League group stages. Of course Ajax were a slightly different team then with Sigthorsson, Boerrigter,Boilesen and Van Der Wiel all available.

Real Madrid Vs Ajax

Ajax Vs Dinamo Zagreb

I have taken passing statistics from two games,one which Ajax won against Zagreb and the other which they lost to Madrid. In both of the games Toby Alderweireld and Jan Vertonghen were the ones who received the most passes. And the most frequent pass combination was not surprisingly between the two center backs themselves. And look at Eriksen's column,in the game against Madrid he has attempted only 6 passes to the striker Sigthorsson. Also the number of passes he attempts per game is quite low for someone so talented(playmaker). Against a full strength Manchester United team building from the back might be a little difficult as both Wayne Rooney and Danny Welbeck(If they start) are hard working and cover a lot of ground. So Berbatov starting for United may be an advantage to Ajax,but the Bulgarian may pose other problems.

It ll be interesting to see what kind of game United will play,Sir Alex Ferguson over the past few seasons has opted to play a patient passing game away in Europe. If United do play that waiting possession game,it ll be an interesting tactical battle with both the teams essentially wanting to do the same thing. In this case Wayne Rooney will be the key player(as he always is). If he starts,he will ensure that United don't get outnumbered and so can let the deeper midfielders dictate the tempo and dominate possession. 

Coming back to Ajax's 4-3-3,it does at times tends to become a 4-6-0 when Ajax lose possession. De Jong who started out the season playing as a second striker tends to drop back. And also the wingers don't stay high up on the pitch. This also is the reason that Ajax can't counter effectively and so use a slow and patient build up starting from the center backs.

Frank De Boer

 "Against lesser teams mistakes are not easily punished. We showed against Real Madrid we can keep possession, now to score goals."-Frank De Boer

Possession is all good only if you make it count,and making it count has been Ajax's major problem this year. But a tie against a side like Manchester United should motivate them and there is talent in the team to cause the English Champions problems. If Frank De Boer decides to play both Lodiero and De Jong,it would be a positive move and will make the game more open and exciting. De Jong does tend to support the striker ahead more than Janssen does,obviously this will mean Ajax will lose control in the center but their effectiveness in the final third will improve.

Frank De Boer may spring a tactical surprise and start with a 3-4-3,a throwback to the days of Cryuff. Of course the similarities end their,but there are some advantages for Ajax with 3 at the back,as Manchester United are most likely to play with 2 strikers and if Rooney doesn't start,United will have 2 men up front who don't drop deep that often. So a spare man at the back will help Ajax defensively and also in retaining possession.

Note-Enoh is out injured,and most probably Ismail Aissati will take his place

Mr Wenger's Epiphany

The following is courtesy of strange bOUnce,a site dedicated to fiction,satire and verse,all lightly brushed up with sport.

Mr Wenger smiled.  “Not at all.  The cacophony of boos when I took Alex off just serves to highlight what a good manager I am.”

The young journo’s reply was a quizzical expression.

“It shows how highly the fans rate him, and means I was right to sign him in the first place!”


Mr Wenger bounced out the room and was soon in the car park.  There, he saw some young boys kicking a tennis ball between themselves.  One of them spotted the Arsenal manager and alerted his mates.

“Hey, look who it is!  Mr Wenger, sir, when’s Abou Diaby back?  He’s always injured these days.”

Mr Wenger smiled.  “It’s hard to tell these things, we must just wait and be patient.  Soon though, I hope.”

The boy looked sad.  “Do you think maybe he was a waste of money, Mr Wenger?  We really need a strong, consistent midfielder but you keep your faith in him and that Czech one with perfect hair, and they’re never fit.”

“Indeed.  But their combined absence today just showed what a good manager I am.”

The boys all replied with quizzical expressions.

“The gaping hole in our midfield shows how much we missed them, and what good signing they would have been if they had two working legs between them!”

Mr Wenger bounded past the boys to his car.  Driving along the motorway, he tuned into Radio Five’s 606.  The phone-in was focused on his club.  DJ Spooney and Jason Roberts were saying some less that complementary things about his tactics.

Mr Wenger phoned in -- using a hands free set, of course -- and immediately he was put through.  

He smiled self-assuredly as he spoke to the presenters.  “My instructions to the players were a little off, perhaps you are right, yes.  The fact we only lost by the one goal though surely serves as an indicator of what a good manager I am?

The presenters responded with a stunned silence, quizzical looks wasted on their listeners.

“What good players I must have picked, if they can perform like this and almost earn a point, even with such a poor strategy and weak leadership.  I should be a scout--”

Mr Wenger stopped mid sentence.  His smile turned into a furrowed brow.  He hung up, not listening to Spoony and Roberts’ responses.  

The epiphany had hit him.  He punched a number agitatedly into his phone.

“Mr Hill-Wood?  Yes, it’s Arsene.  Yes, fine.  Yes.  No.  No.  No.  No, we can’t afford.. No... Listen, can you get an errand boy -- yes Andrei will be fine -- to get me the following, for first thing tomorrow?  One cardboard box, big enough to clear my desk, one notepad, big enough for the names of six hundred African midfielders, and one long, warm, winter coat.  I’ll be needing to keep warm in my new calling, and the flimsy little thing I have at the moment’s no good at all.”

He hung up abruptly again, not giving the Arsenal Chairman a chance to answer.

Arsene smiled again, as he ripped up his half empty tactics book.  This time, however, for the first time in years, his smile was a genuine one.


-Jude Ellery

England's tactical journey under Capello

Capello’s departure just 4 months before a major tournament leaves a lot to be desired, and a bad taste in the mouth too. Whatever the reasons behind the reasons for his departure are, the presented facts are that Capello spoke out against the FA’s decision feeling that he had been undermined and declaring that he did not agree with the decision. Not wanting to try and read between the lines or speculate on national characteristics or personal attitudes and working relationships, the facts are that Capello has gone.

Looking back at his tenure, it’s difficult to sum up in simple terms. Yes, he has the highest win percentage of any England manager ever, but he also presided over the debacle of the 2010 World Cup, which was statistically England’s worst ever. Alf Ramsey won a lower percentage of games, but crucially won the World Cup in 1966. Bobby Robson has a lower win percentage than Steve McLaren, but is far more fondly remembered because he led the team to an agonising semi-final exit at Italia 90 whereas McLaren will be remembered for his humbling failure to reach Euro 2008. Performances when it counts is what a legacy is founded on. Fabio Capello England reign will most likely be remembered as a failure then, because of the dismal display in South Africa and quite frankly humiliating destruction by the hosts.

It is often said that more is learnt in defeat than in victory – ergo, Capello should only be considered a true failure if lessons from South Africa 2010 were not heeded. The most stark lesson was that the 4-4-2 was dead in the water on the international stage. So long the English national team’s bedrock and point of reference, its default and natural state; the 4-4-2 was demolished in 270 soul-destroying and 90 breathtaking minutes.

Indications are that, yes, lessons were learnt by Capello. He played England in a 4-4-2 just three times in the fifteen games since the World Cup (Admittedly winning all three).

When Capello was appointed, much was made of his disciplinarian nature – this was the man to break the dressing-room cliques, pop the inflated egos and crush player power. This was the man who dropped Beckham at Madrid, the man who had managed some of the greatest names in football’s illustrious history whilst in Italy and Spain, one of the most decorated managers in the domestic game. He did that to some extent, but not everyone got the message. John Terry’s failed revolution was, well… revolting.

He was also heralded as the manager to bring England up to date tactically. People must have forgotten his glory years at Milan were largely based on a 4-4-2 formation, and he played that same formation at Juventus and Real Madrid. Tactical innovator? Perhaps not. But he is a master at creating tactical systems to suit his playing staff. The perennial problem of managing a national side is an extrapolation of the old adage “you can chose your friends but you can’t chose your family” – Capello couldn’t buy Sergio Busquets from Spain, or Messi from Argentina, or Ozil from Germany; he had to work with what he had at his disposal. For a nation of footballers whose very bread and butter had been 4-4-2 since childhood, it would be tough to get those players to adapt.

A loss to France in his second game in charge when deploying his team in a 4-2-3-1 prompted a return to 4-4-2, and after winning two friendlies against USA and Trinidad using 4-4-2, Capello fell short again with a 4-2-3-1 by drawing with Czech Republic. The remainder of 2008 went well for Capello’s 4-4-2, in the next five games he only once deviated to a 4-3-3 against Kazakhstan winning 5-1 and the other four games were victories too. The final game in 2008 was a 2-1 win over a German team who were learning their own lessons in time for 2010.

Capello played 4-4-2 six times in his first year in charge – resulting in six wins out of six.

In 2009, Capello’s second year in charge of England, he suffered an educational defeat at the hands of a very proficient Spanish side (This defeat would be used as a benchmark against which a later victory would be compared – as evidence of progress) and this prompted a big change in tactics. The next six games were played using the popular and modern 4-2-3-1, in an attempt to replicate somehow the tiki-taka game of the Spanish national side, or Barca-without-Messi as they are better known. Only Holland could keep England from victory in that run of games. This was a great period for Capello, that run without loss lasted seven games in all, culminating in a huge 5-1 crushing of new rivals Croatia – that win used as a contrast to McLaren’s battles with Slaven Bilic. During those matches, Rooney was used in the middle of the attacking midfield trio, and scored 4 goals from that position over 6 games. Momentum was building – in the press and trickled down into the nation’s consciousness, 4-2-3-1 was the future, and England has the players to fit. Then the campaign to do away with 4-4-2 took a knock, a loss to Ukraine at the tail end of the year using 4-2-3-1 again prompted Capello to retreat to the safety of 4-4-2. The belief that if England lost using 4-4-2 then it would be England’s fault – the entire nation; or even more-so, the fear that suffering defeat whilst tactically experimenting would result in castigation, in the manner which McLaren was torn apart by the press after trying 3-5-2 in Zagreb. In 2009 4-2-3-1 was Capello’s most used formation, winning four out of seven games and losing just once. 4-4-2 was used only four times - two wins and two defeats.

But Capello used the safety net of 4-4-2 - following that defeat to Ukraine, England took the field in that old familiar formation. Momentum and spirit was raised with easy victories in the warm-up games, and then… well we all know what happened then. In 2010 England played 4-4-2 nine times, winning six but critically drawing twice and losing once. However, the safety net effect of 4-4-2 is still there. One can only imagine the uproar if England had have had such a dismal tournament and not played 4-4-2. But then of course, they might not have done so badly….

After England’s disgraced team returned home, the campaign to ditch the 4-4-2 was started up afresh. Since the World Cup, Capello has experimented far more than he had before (and of course, during). In 2011 England played nine games and only once trotted out in a 4-4-2, and that was the first game against Denmark, which England won 2-1 but were given a scare by wunderkind Christian Eriksen. It will be remembered as the year that Scott Parker finally established himself as the first choice defensive midfielder for England. Four times England have set out in variations of 4-1-4-1, three of those with Parker as the lynchpin, including of course the much heralded 1-0 victory over World Champions Spain. That performance has been rightly accredited as a fine defensive performance, much in the way that the famous 0-0 draw in the Stadio Olimpico was on the road to qualification for the 1998 World Cup. Scott Parker, Phil Jones and Gareth Barry were all used in the midfield during that game, more evidence that Capello had learnt from the World Cup

.

Crucially, Capello thought that the answer to the Lampard-Gerrard puzzle was Gareth Barry, and it wasn’t. Whilst Bobby Robson had the iconic image of Gazza crying to remember Italia 90 by, Capello’s legacy will forever be blighted by the images of Barry being completely outpaced and outclassed by a ruthless and mobile German attack. Blitzkreig indeed.

So, whilst he’ll always be remembered for what happened in Bloemfontein, Capello the disciplinarian used his time at the helm of England to nurse the team away from the comfort blanket of 4-4-2, even if he faltered spectacularly on the way. In the long term, the FA will hope that the disastrous campaign in South Africa can be used as a point to build up from, much in the way that Germany itself recovered from disappointing returns in the 1998 World Cup and even more-so from Euro 2000.

Football Venn Diagrams-The Anfield Cat!

Click the picture to enlarge.

A Game of two halves - Chelsea 3-3 Manchester United

Not so many years ago, this fixture would’ve had the country enraptured – streets would’ve been deserted, cars abandoned with their engines idling, their owners pressed up against TV rental showroom windows, babes left crying in their cots, dogs left scratching at the back door wanting to be let out – everything had to wait. But the days of Chelsea being title contenders have gone, for now at least, and Chelsea’s home record is not what it was. Chelsea are not in the two horse race for the title, they are six points behind Tottenham who play tomorrow, and they went into this game twelve points behind their former sparring partners. Perhaps only Arsenal’s patchy season is saving Chelsea from more derision than they are getting – the thoughts are though, that this is a team in transition which will come good again.

Chelsea and Manchester United are both sides who have had injury problems of late. Manchester United could put out a fairly decent side made up of all of the absent players. Lindegaard in goal, Smalling, Phil Jones, Vidic and De Laet make up a serviceable back four, across the midfield you could have Nani, Cleverley, Anderson and *cough* Bebe *cough*, with old Mickey Owen running around quite slowly not winning headers up front. Seriously though, six of those eleven would’ve been considered for the starting eleven had they been fit.  Chelsea are not quite as crippled as United, but were still missing the spine of their team. Terry, Lampard out injured, along with Ramires and Mikel - and Drogba still away at the Africa Cup of Nations.

Chelsea lined up in a now familiar 4-3-3, but with a few subtle tweaks. Villas-Boas has shown some compromise in his footballing beliefs, but is still a man who trusts his philosophy of pressing all over the pitch and a high back line. The compromises came in the positioning of the two wingers Sturridge and Mata. Mata in truth played more centrally, allowing Malouda to push up the left wing, although there was interchange between the two. Malouda had ostensibly been included as one of the midfield three along with Meireles and Essien. It could be described as a 4-2-3-1, with Torres ploughing the lonely furrow on his own, but Sturridge’s attacking instincts had him in a striking position, while Torres often drifted wide to the right.

John Terry has looked to be one of those Chelsea players who struggle with the new system, and whether the acquisition of Gary Cahill from Bolton was a short-term measure with an eye on court proceedings (Now a mute-point as Terry’s court date has been set for after the season has finished) or whether he’s been brought in to provide a long-term replacement for Terry, Cahill’s style should suit that high line better than Terry. He’s more mobile and quick-witted too, he’ll suit the style – whether he has the quality to help turn Chelsea back into contenders is still in question.

There were no surprises in the back five – although any line up with David Luiz included has the potential for surprises at any stage. Ashley Cole missed the game through suspension, so Bosingwa filled in on the left. Manchester United fans will have been licking their lips in anticipation of an in-form Valencia up against Bosingwa playing on his less favoured side.

How did Manchester United line up? Well… was it a 4-2-3-1 with Giggs and Carrick as a double-pivot behind the trio of Valencia, Rooney and Young in support of Welbeck? Or was it a 4-4-2, or a 4-4-1-1. Rooney is the x-factor here. He prowls the field of play almost in a free role, confusing opposition markers and confounding pundits by popping up all over the place. The concern for United fans won’t be at which string of numbers best represent the formation, but at the names at the heart of the defence. Ferdinand is not having a good season. He’s not got the get-out-of-jail pace he used to have, and Johnny Evans will have to produce a large number of outstanding displays before he will ever be trusted as a first choice centre-back for United. Let’s call it a 4-4-2 for Sir Alex’s sake.

The first half was in a way reminiscent of a Mourinho era Chelsea. Functional, disciplined, and effective. They were perhaps fortunate not to concede one penalty, and also perhaps fortunate not to have Gary Cahill sent off for felling Welbeck just outside the box with no other defender looking in a position to trouble the attacker. As it was both decisions were called no fouls, much to the annoyance of the men in red. These things have a way of evening up over as season, but rarely do they do so over the course of the same game.

Although, as mentioned above it looked on paper that the most easily won duel between player could have been Bosingwa up against Valencia, it was on the other flank and in the favour of the other team that the mismatch actually presented itself. Captain Patrice Evra was given a torrid time during the opening half, and for large periods of the second. Evra isn’t one of those modern attacking fullbacks who can’t defend – he’s a good defensive player who is also adept at overlapping on the attack, but he was out of sorts for much of this match. Two of Chelsea’s goals came about because Evra couldn’t deal with Sturridge. Capello take note!

First, Evra allowed Sturridge to skip past him and cut a ball back across from the byline, which ricocheted off De Gea and Evans into the net. Perhaps that should read “the hapless De Gea and the hapless Evans”. The third goal – not entirely Evra’s fault – but his foul on Sturridge, bringing the Chelsea player down as he went by again, gave Chelsea the free-kick from which Mata set up David Luiz to head home. The David Luiz surprise element in this story is that he was almost completely unmarked, Ferdinand trying to look stern after the event when everyone knew that sheepish would have been more apt. Between Manchester United’s calamitous concessions was the pick of the goals, what was missing from forty five minutes of the first half came to fruition just forty seconds into the second – a moment of genuine quality - Torres showing his team mates how to assist a goal with a wonderful cross to Mata who slammed a thundering volley home with his left.

When the third went in, Sir Alex Ferguson had to act. The ineffective (some would say woeful) Ashley Young was replaced by Javier Hernandez who went up top alongside Welbeck, with Rooney pulling the strings just behind. This gave Evra the impetus to drive forward more. Sturridge had inflicted real damage on the United left-back, and it was his turn to be on the back foot. An Evra run into the box highlighted the fact that Sturridge is a striker, converted to a winger, asked to contribute defensively – it was a clumsy tackle in the box.

Rooney duly equalised form the spot, and the comeback was on. Not many teams would even consider fighting back from 3-0 down at Stamford Bridge, let alone be able to – but a team like Manchester United wouldn’t consider not fighting back. Ferguson appraised his bench and sent on another attacking substitution. Paul Scholes came on for Rafael, Valencia switched to right-back as he has many times now, and Giggs was shuffled out to the left. The old master proved his worth yet again with the cross for United’s equaliser. At the time of the tactical switch, a comeback had seemed improbable.

Clumsy defending might have been to blame for two of Chelsea’s shipped goals, but the tactical changes made by Ferguson forced pressure on Chelsea, who really didn’t have an answer. Chelsea had found themselves 3-0 without really playing that well – Mata’s goal aside – and in the end might be considered lucky to get a point which is a ridiculous situation to find themselves in after leading by three clear goals. The instructions given to Villas-Boas' men are to press and look for interceptions all over the pitch. Once the comeback had begun, his players just didn't perfrom this as well as they had in the first half, which barring two penalty claims, was a pretty barren period of football for Manchester United.

Chelsea's interceptions where down from 19 in the first half to just 8 in the second. Ferguson removed ineffective players, shuffled players of influence into more dangerous positions, and clawed back a three goal deficit.