The False 9:Year In Review

What a fantastic year 2011 has been,Manchester United finally knocking off Liverpool of their "perch" by claiming their 19th English League title. Barcelona continued their dominance by winning the Champions League and the Club World Cup. But this year one certainly didn't see revolutionary tactics,but there were many a interesting tweaks and innovations. Barcelona with their 3-4-3 and Napoli's brilliant counter attacking style were some examples.
So if you haven't been following The False 9 for the past 8 months or you once again want to brush up your memory on how a media punta actually works or why the Libero  may be the next big thing in football,then have a read.



May


May saw the start of our Rough Diamonds series where we look at young players who have the potential to be World-Class footballers when they reach their prime. This series was also featured on A Football Report's The Best of Football Writing in 2011.

Then as a preview of the Champions League final we did a piece called The Champions League Final If  I Was God. Sadly for Manchester United fans the match didn't turn out the way it was described in the article.

June

June saw us get serious with The Makelele Role,Javier Hernandez-Rebirth Of the Poacher and The Libero-The Next Tactical Innovation.

We also mulled whether the likes of Andy Carroll and QPR will be a success in 2011-12 in Andy Carroll-The 35M Throwback and QPR-Will They Survive?

Then we previewed Argentina's chances at the Copa America and this article was featured on The Guardian's Favorite things this week.

Next we threw an insight what sort of roles Ashley Young and Nuri Sahin will play at their new clubs.

Finally we tried answering the age old question of whether Barcelona can do it on a cold December night at Stoke

July


We tried answering another eternal question,Why England Never Win?

Also we did some analyisis on if Argentina are the new England?


August


August saw the start of the football season,so we were busy doing Match Previews and Reviews which are of little use now.
So the only article which you people may interested in would be the The Death Of The Box To Box Midfielder

September


We ran out of steam in September with only 3 articles,but Jose Mourinho would be very interested in this one-How To Beat Barcelona?

October


In the early parts of the season Manchester United conceded a lot of goals,read a comprehensive analysis on how they were conceded.

Also take a look at how Levante found themselves at the top of La Liga.

November


November was an exciting month for us,as we were nominated for the NOPAs.Sadly we didn't win the award.

We started out Legends series and onto more serious stuff we discussed how the Future could be strikerless for Spain.


Another article which was quite popular was Mikel Arteta,Media Puntas and The False 9s.


For the people who hate football tactics and still think Messi is just a number 10 and not a false 9 we recommend Football and Alcohol and When Fergie Lost by 9!.

December


Start of December saw us previewing the El Clasico with a series of articles which included Mesut Ozil-From a German Heart to a Spanish Dance.


And we ended the year with Oriol Romeu-David Luiz's Saviour?  and In Praise of Attacking Fullbacks.


Have A Happy 2012!

Conventional wingers: A dying breed?

In the good old days, the rules of playing football were simple, and so were the tactics. The big and sturdy lads played in the centre of the park and upfront, the hard lads guarded the back, the bright ones played as inside forwards and the little, quick ones played on the wings. The left footed ones played on the left, and the right footed ones played on the right. And the one who had no partner to rely on, played in goal.

Some eight decades ago, 2-3-5 ruled football. Then came this guy called Herbert Chapman who was the manager of Huddersfield Town (and later Arsenal). He decided to change the way the game was played, and switched his team’s formation from the traditional 2-3-5 to the famed W-M formation, which actually translated into 3-2-2-3 on the football pitch. Chapman did away altogether with wing-play, his firm belief that inside passing was “more deadly, if less spectacular than the senseless policy of running along the lines and centering just in front of the goalmouth, where the odds are nine to one on the defenders.”

Herbert Chapman – Man with a plan

Chapman won two  FA Cups and five league titles in all with Huddersfield Town and Arsenal between 1922 and 1933 with this ideology, but the image of a winger dribbling, running past full backs and crossing into the box remained the ideal sight to the eyes of English football lovers. One might argue that Chapman’s success should have ended any such notions, but the nostalgia associated with wingers continued to breed in the minds of the English.

Then came the Second World War, and when it ended – there was a sudden influx of wingers in English football. Stanley Matthews, Tom Finney, Jimmy Mullen, Len Shackleton, Charlie Mitten were some of the names that emerged in the aftermath of the war, delighting the spectators with their adventurous displays on the flanks. Suddenly, it seemed that Chapman’s theories had become a thing of the past and wing-play became the trend in English football again.

Stanley Matthews – Greatest conventional winger of all time?

The epitome of wing-play came in 1953, when Stanley Matthews’s heroics on the right wing almost single-handedly won the FA Cup final for Blackpool against Bolton Wanderers. However, the Soviets were scornful of such individualism as against the collectivist mode of theirs, Dinamo Moscow manager Mikhail Yakushin noting that –

“The principle of collective play is the guiding one in Soviet football. A player must not only be good in general; he must be good for the particular team. His individual qualities are high, but we put collective football first and individual football second, so we do not favour his style as we think teamwork would suffer.”

The 6-3 hammering at the hands of Hungary at Wembley – just six months after Matthews’s performance in the Cup final – was just the beginning of the end for the winger in that era. But the final nail on the coffin was the shift from three at the back of a W-M formation to maintaining a back four, thus resulting in a 4-4-2 (or 4-1-3-2) as we know today. The process began during the early 1950s in Hungary, the USSR and Brazil, and gained universal recognition when Brazil won back-to-back World Cups in 1958 and 1962.

Alf Ramsey developed his own ideas on the 4-4-2 formation in the mid 1960s and by the time England won the World Cup in 1966, the winger was no more the traditional winger. He was now regarded as a wide midfielder, who was not only supposed to run down the flank and cross the ball into the box, but also put in a defensive shift by negating the effectiveness of the opposition full backs.

Football tactics continued to evolve, and formations such as the 4-3-3 or the 4-2-4 came into the limelight in the next two decades, when the ‘wide midfielder’ became sort of a ‘wide forward’, but the winger remained a distant memory. The Dutch adopted ‘totaalvoetbal’ or ‘total football’ which brought considerable success, and attacking flair came to be associated with the Netherlands national team and Ajax of that time. However, the popularity of the 4-4-2 persisted, compelling Johan Cruyff to describe its dominance as the “death of football”.

Masters of 'total football'

The new millennium brought back the wingers, as different formations such as 4-5-1 or 4-2-3-1 came to prominence along with 4-4-2. The 4-2-3-1 accommodated two holding midfielders, which allowed the managers to play wingers with full backs overlapping them. A new breed of wingers – the inverted wingers – cropped up in the meantime who could play on the opposite flank, unlike the one matching their stronger foot. The overlapping full backs remained outside the box while the wingers cut inside.

Such a tendency to move infield was a deviation from the original perception that the true purpose of a winger was to run past defenders to the goal line and whip in a cross into the penalty area. As the lone striker would require some kind of support in the box from midfield when it came to scoring goals, the wingers cut inside to assist the centre forwards. The inverted wingers could come inside onto their stronger foot while attacking the weaker foot of the opposition full back, and it also enabled them to take a better shot on goal. This was the only explanation for the modern directness of such wing-play.

There are numerous examples where an inverted winger operates with an overlapping full back. Robert Pires with Ashley Cole (Arsenal’s ‘Invincibles’), Arjen Robben with Gregory van der Wiel (the Netherlands) or with Philip Lahm (Bayern Munich), Angel Di Maria with Alvaro Arbeloa (Real Madrid) or even Ashley Young or Luis Nani with Patrice Evra (Manchester United) are prime examples.

Arjen Robben – The Inverted Winger

One might also find attacking midfielders drifting onto the opposite flank and doubling up as wingers. The best example that can be cited is Lionel Messi at Barcelona, though there are other prominent ones such as Niko Kranjcar and Luka Modric at Tottenham Hotspur. Cristiano Ronaldo and Wayne Rooney might be known as strikers, but their ability to play anywhere across the forward line means they could occupy a similar role when needed.

Currently, they are few teams in Europe that operate with conventional wingers. Barcelona, the champions of Europe last season, do not have any natural wingers in their team. Players like Iniesta or Dani Alves often play out wide in midfield, but their ‘tiki-taka’ style of play doesn’t require an outright winger as such. Similar is the case with English giants like Chelsea and Arsenal, who usually operate in the 4-3-3 formation.

However, teams like Manchester United, Bayern Munich and Tottenham Hotspur have held on to the belief that wing-play is essential to their counterattacking style. Manchester United have Luis Antonio Valencia, who is a right-footed right winger – a throwback to the good old times. Then there is Gareth Bale, who has been consistently doing well for Tottenham as an outright left-footed left winger.

So the conventional winger has now become a ‘new age’ winger of sorts – one who can take on full backs, score goals and operate as a playmaker rather than just getting to the by-line and curl in crosses. With the evolution of tactics, one might as well witness him doing just about everything there’s to do with the ball on the pitch.

This Post first appeared on Sportskeeda

-Abhinav Chakraborty

In Praise of: Attacking Full-Backs

The modern full-back has many duties to perform. No longer is it enough to leave an opposition winger stud-pocked and bruised, a modern full-back must also present an attacking threat of his own. He must overlap his own winger, get to the byline and deliver a cross.

A modern full-back must have pace, he must have discipline and positional sense, he must have good technique and great stamina.

Perhaps the most famous full-back in the history of football, certainly in recent decades, is Paolo Maldini. He represented a different breed of full-back to those prominent in the modern game. Strong in the tackle, great in the air, and a gifted reader of the game, his defensive qualities gave him a splendid career lasting 25 seasons at one of the top clubs in Europe. But, he wouldn’t get into most modern sides. Certainly not as a left back. True – he was equally imperious at centre-back for AC Milan, and would certainly fit the bill with any top side today in his prime. But at full-back, the role has changed. His eventual replacement at Milan and for the Azzuri, Gianluca Zambrotta is much more attacking minded than the great Maldini. Zambrotta is facing a challenge for his Milan spot (where perhaps his utility is a drawback) from Luca Antonini – a converted left winger.

A lot has been written about the specialisation on midfielders and attackers – deep lying playmakers, trequartistas, false nines… traditional roles on the football pitch are blurring and redefining. An attacking full-back may seem to be an oxymoron, but there’s few teams who don’t employ them these days. Teams like Barcelona are characterised by full-backs so far up the pitch that the defensive midfielder (First choice being Sergio Busquets) is more often than not nearer his own goal than members of his back four. Brazilian Dani Alves spends more time in the opposition half than his own, giving width to a system that has converted strikers playing as wingers and drifting infield when in possession. Indeed, it is the prevalence of attacking midfielders than has prompted the high demand, effusive acclaim and high transfer fees for top quality defensive midfielders.

Brazilians have long been at the forefront of attacking full-back play. Carlos Alberto scroed one of the most famous World Cup goals in history in 1970 whilst playing as a right-back, and a lot of the best modern attacking full-backs are Brazilian. Dani Alves, Maicon, Michel Bastos, Marcelo, Felipe, the da Silva twins and before all of those Roberto Carlos and Cafu are all more comfortable on the front foot. Such is the trend at the moment that quite often some full-backs at top clubs are somewhat questionable in defence. England’s current first choice right back Glen Johnson is better known for his attacking forays and  occasional wonder goals than for his tackling and defensive prowess. On the other flank for the three lions, Ashley Cole – arguably one of the world’s best attacking left-backs – has the rare quality of looking just as comfortable playing one-twos on the opposition 18 yard box as he is slide tackling on the edge of his own. To see Ashley Cole playing so well for Chelsea over recent years is to wonder why successive England managers have struggled to find an answer to “the left midfield problem” over the years. Don’t forget that when breaking into the Arsenal team all those years ago he was keeping Sylvinho out of the side, who at the time was keeping Roberto Carlos out of the Brazilian national team.

The prevalence of attack-minded full-backs and the influence that they have on games is perhaps best illustrated by the praise given to those considered the best in this position. Philippe Lahm is definintely one of those considered the best – the distinction given to him is that… well… he can defend a bit. The emphasis given to the attacking duties for a full-back has become so dominant that full-backs that can actually defend are singled out. Gary Neville, for all his detractors on Merseyside and elsewhere, was considered one of the very best – because in addition to his famous close relationship on and off the pitch with David Beckham, he was a fantastic defender too. Towards the end of his career he curbed the attacking instincts to an extent, but in his pomp he was renowned for overlapping and getting crosses in, and also for covering back to win the ball back from wingers. Neville was an automatic name on both Manchester United and England team-sheets for ten or so years, earning 400 league appearances and 85 international caps. There’s no doubting that he revelled equally in the ire directed by opposition fans as he did in the support from his own. Gary Neville won eight Premier League winners medals, but came up short on the international scene. Not his fault really….

One player who has won international tournaments is Sergio Ramos. He might look like the kid from Home Improvement who went on to star in Pinocchio and not much else, but he’s also a damn fine example of an attacking full-back. Admittedly, not the best at defending…

As is the current trend in all discussions tactical, we will always, inevitably, inexorably, inescapably turning to look at Barcelona. This season, Guardiola has often sent out his team in a 3-4-3 formation. Using Mascherano as a centre-back, more able than most to bring the ball out of defence, and sending Alves into midfield itself. It would be easy to imagine Pep Guardiola saying to Alves “Just do what you do Dani” and sending him out. Iniesta has ostensibly lined up at left midfield, but the vast majority of the width has been provided by Alves.

Perhaps we’re witnessing the next tactical evolution…? Necessity being the mother of invention, it was expected that the next big thing would be finding a way to beat Barca’s tiki-taka style, but maybe it will just be the further refinement of that style. More in midfield, and with a defensive midfielder more competent and confident at passing the ball around to keep possession…  this team could be even more frustratingly good than before. Death by possession…

What should we call it? Tiki-taka-toe?

Marseille 2-1 Lorient:Cheyrou wins it for Marseille

It’s not so often that you see two 4-4-2s pitted against each other these days, but this was the case as Marseille snatched a 2-1 win over Lorient. This game nicely illustrates Jonathan Wilson’s point that: “Formations are neutral; it is their application that gives them positive or negative qualities.”

BBC African Player of the Year André Ayew was unavailable for OM, although his brother Jordan started upfront alongside Loïc Rémy. Jérémy Morel and Morgan Amalfitano lined up against the club they left in the summer. Lorient lined up as expected, except for Mathias Autret starting on the right in the place of Yann Jouffre.

Kick and rush?

The start of the match was frantic, both teams looking to bypass the creative zone with long balls. This can be a feature of teams playing 4-4-2; with less obvious short passing options than a single-striker formation, getting the ball straight to wingers and forwards or behind the defence. But in this instance, the teams had enough quality and avoided a “kick and rush” game; Lorient putting together some neat passes once the game settled, before Marseille grew into the game following Lamine Koné’s 32nd minute sending-off and finished with 66% possession.

Left midfielders cut inside

Rather than simply playing flying wingers, both teams mixed it up on the flanks to good effect. The right-sided players on either team, Amalfitano and Autret, did stay in position out wide and offered a direct crossing threat. However, Mathieu Valbuena would wander in from Marseille’s left, often ending up on the opposite flank to create an overload (much like Silva and Milner have been doing at Manchester City). On Lorient’s left flank, Mathieu Coutadeur would drift into the middle to replicate the numerical advantage gained from playing three in the centre and was a great influence on his side’s attacking play in the first half. As a knock-on effect, both left-backs (Morel and Mareque) had a tendency to drift forward on the overlap.

The difference in the movement of the left-sided players and their right-sided counterparts is evident from the heat maps below.

                          

                   

                      

                   

How to defend without a holder

It was easy to see which team was more used to playing in a 4-4-2 shape. Lorient stayed compact throughout the game, with the defensive line never far from the midfield. This caused the defence to push up when Lorient had the ball which may have cost them, as Rémy had space to run in behind the defence, forcing Koné to haul him down. However, the general result had been to deny Marseille space between the lines. 

The home side allowed too much of this space to Coutadeur to play through balls in the first half. It was clear that the defence are used to having a holding midfielder sweeping up in front of them, so sat back a bit, but having only two in the centre meant they had less protection. Alou Diarra and Stephane M’bia are both players who are comfortable at sitting in front of the defence, but were troubled by Lorient’s passing and got drawn higher up the pitch (as well as having more responsibility to get forward than in, say, a 4-2-3-1).

Compare this with Lorient’s approach when Marseille dominated in the second half. They formed two banks of four and the central midfielders stationed themselves close to the deeper defence. While this standing off could have been punished if Marseille had someone who could provide creativity from deep, they were successful in stifling Marseille’s attacking play until late on.

Fluidity key in attack

Rather than the traditional strike partnerships of yore (big man-little man, creator-poacher etc.), some of the teams of today who use two centre-forwards will play a style in which neither of them acts as a focal point. Instead, they drop off into space between the lines to create chances for the attacking midfielders or their partner, almost like playing with a pair of false nines. Think, for example, of the Rooney-Tevez partnership at Manchester United (which Ferguson could be trying to recreate with Danny Welback). Other prominent examples are the Aguëro-Balotelli partnership at City and Rossi-Cassano for Italy.

The duo of Kevin Monnet-Paquet and Joel Campbell, while lacking the ability of those players, worked to similar effect here. Monnet-Paquet was very lively, dropping into the hole to link Lorient’s play and moving out to the wing to provide width when Coutadeur came inside. Campbell, on loan from Arsenal, played more like a proper no.9 but liked to drift to the right before cutting in. 

This fluidity is a feature throughout Christian Gourcuff’s side and allowed them to put together some wonderful passing triangles, playing their way out of defence and creating chances to slip through balls to onrushing players. The succession of neat lay-offs from their slick passing moves sent Jean-Alaixys Romao through in the first half and he should have squared for one of his team-mates to score. Unfortunately for Lorient, going to ten men severely compromised their ability to put attacking combinations together. Going to 4-4-1, with Romao filling in at centre-back and Monnet-Paque to the left wing, they didn’t offer enough support for Campbell.

Marseille, meanwhile, looked ponderous in attacking even when dominating. Ayew and Rémy didn’t do enough to link the play. Deschamps could have changed to a formation involving an extra midfielder to provide creativity, but perhaps this is one of the trappings of playing 4-4-2 when going after a goal; reducing the amount of strikers you have feels like a backward move. Anyway, Marseille often struggled for ideas and would often resort to getting their full-backs to cross hopefully from deep.

Individuals settle game

Why is 4-4-2 is so well-loved in England? Could it be that the country which, more than any in Europe, values individuality (rather than the collective) likes to see a system in which individual players makes the difference? Whether that’s complete bollocks or not, some would argue that such a simple tactical match-up makes for a game settled by individual contributions rather than tactical wizardry.

First, Innocent Emeghara (on for Campbell) latched on to a long ball then beat Diarra and Mandanda to give Lorient the lead on 77 minutes. Seven minutes later, the bright Valbuena finally found some space in behind Lorient’s midfield and placed the ball into the top corner of Fabien Audard’s goal. And in stoppage time, the midfielder’s free-kick was headed home by Benoit Cheyrou (who could have been marked by Romao if he hadn’t been sent off seconds earlier).

At the same time, we’ve already seen complex tactical factors affecting the game and causing it to be more than a simple battle of 4-4-2s. And even if the goals were more down to individual contributions, they can’t be fully separated from tactics – Emeghara only had to beat one defender for his goal because Marseille were pushing forward in an attempt to score.

Marseille dominated the possession and shot statistics and may have won comfortably without a good performance from Audard, but did lack the finesse to create openings for much of the match. The team looks a lot more comfortable with a single striker formation and will surely return to this once the older Ayew brother returns, but need to show more cohesion going forwardif they are to challenge for the Champions League.

As for Lorient, they played some good positive football early on but did not contribute much after going down to ten men (which is understandable at the Stade Velodrome). I’d recommend watching this little-known side if you get the chance; their purist-pleasing style is created by manager Gourcuff despite the limitations of running such a small club. You can see the difference between his coaching ability and the resources available to him when Autret knows exactly where to move in relation to his team-mates, but lacks the basic technique to control the ball once he’s in a good position. Anyway, the Brittany club should be staying the top half and continue to trouble France’s big boys.

-Ihsaan Budaly

Oriol Romeu-David Luiz's Saviour?

Oriol Romeu at 6ft 1in and with his muscular body must be the most un-Barcaish player to have emerged from La Masia. He may not have the technique or the vision of his former partners in crime at La Masia,but the former Espanyol youth player 's tactical reading and his willingness to cover for his teammates is vital,especially when you have gifted ball playing midfielders ahead of you. Chelsea's resurgence in recent times is mainly due to the fact that they have tightened at the back and are conceding less goals. Earlier in the season the defence was leaky and with Obi Mikel out of sorts and Essien injured,they didn't play with a recognised defensive midfielder which added to their defensive woes. Now,playing with Romeu in front of the back four and playing a deeper defensive line,the blues are more organised and are looking to challenge for the Premier League

 When you have someone like David Luiz playing in the center of defence,you need to have someone responsible and defensively capable player to cover for him. Many people feel David Luiz remains a liability in defence and doesn't deserve a place at Chelsea,but in these days where opposition teams generally tend to play with two holding midfielders,the ball playing central defender becomes a potent goal-creating(scoring) threat. But as we have seen many times with Luiz,it is catastrophic for some one playing in that position to be adventurous. Last season's title deciding game at Old Trafford was one of the numerous occasions where Chelsea had to pay for David Luiz's lack of defensive awareness. So people may ask,why not drop him?

Fantastic technique,great finish and dribbling skills which will make any Premier League winger proud,which manager doesn't want such a player in his team. And when that player is a central defender ,it is an added bonus as the opposition rarely makes plans or assigns someone to mark a central defender. Having said all of this, a defender's primary duty is to defend and Luiz doesn't seem to have understood that fully. So why not play him in midfield or as a full back?

Barcelona under Pep Guardiola have been the source of many tactical innovations over the past 3-4 years. And players changing their starting positions to perform different roles has been a main tactic,Lionel Messi dropping back to play the false 9 role,Dani Alves playing as a right winger,David Villa cutting in from the left to play as a striker. So this shows that moving away from your initial position and role is the order of the day. In terms of positioning there may not be much difference in a number 10 and a false 9,but as Lionel Messi will tell you there is a world of difference. In the el clasico,Pep Guaridiola after 20 minutes switched Puyol from center back to right back and asked Busquets to drop deeper. This move was vital in Barca fighting back from a goal down and winning the game. Sergio Busquets after the switch, didn't exactly play as a center back.

Source-Opta Jose Twitter Account

The picture above shows that Busquets was neither a center back nor a defensive midfielder,Barcelona were playing with a back 3 and a half . Now coming back to Romeu and Luiz,they seem to be the perfect pair to replicate such a switch. Luiz can be given more freedom to attack,especially when Chelsea are chasing the game, Luiz can push forward and go on runs into the final third with the assurance that Romeu will cover for him if there is a counter attack. Both of them have unconventional skills set,which do not allow them to perform specific roles,Romeu's passing and vision is not of enough quality to play as a deep lying playmaker and we all know about Luiz's limitations as a central defender. So it makes perfect sense for AVB to try out the 3 and a half defence and allow David Luiz the freedom he craves. Having said all of this, its not certain that something which works for Barcelona will work for Chelsea,as players under Guardiola have been brought up together and understand each other's roles on the pitch very well. For players to achieve a level of fluidity where they can seamlessly switch positions and roles,they require a good understanding of each other's game which requires time and loads of training ground practice.

For David Luiz to continue playing as a central defender at the highest level in a flat 4-4-2,he needs to curb his attacking instincts and remain disciplined. Even if that is possible,Chelsea will lose a goal scoring threat in the final third. So the ideal solution for AVB is to play a back 3 and a half with Romeu playing as a half CB-half DM. AVB can do this by bringing Ivanovic slightly inside and giving Luiz a free role on the right. So the young Oriol Romeu may be the key to David Luiz's future at Chelsea. 

Maybe someday we will get to see Premier League teams playing football like the Dutch national team of 1970s

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Football Venn Diagrams

El Clásico:Luis Figo

Could we write a series like this without this man? The most infamous of the Clásico Heartbreakers, followed by some honourable mentions...

Clásico appearances: 23 (14 for Barcelona, 9 for Real Madrid)
Clásico goals: 4 (3 for Barcelona, 1 for Real Madrid)
Barcelona record: W7 D4 L3
Real Madrid record: W4 D3 L2



Even before arriving in Spain, Luis Figo was at the heart of transfer controversy. Having unwittingly entered an agreement with Juventus in 1995 due to the influence of his club, Sporting Lisbon, an angered Figo then attempted to sign a contract with Parma. As a result, Figo was banned from transferring to an Italian club for two years, something he attributes to the influence of corrupt Juventus director Luciano Moggi. However, Barcelona came to the rescue with a bid of £2.25 million for the Portugal international.

Figo was initially billed as a replacement for Michael Laudrup, who had moved to bitter rivals Real Madrid a year ago. But soon after arriving at the Camp Nou he was moved from a central position to the right wing, where he would play the best football of his career. Possessing excellent ball control, great awareness of his team-mates’ movement and an unpredictable burst of acceleration, Figo was instrumental as Barca won La Liga in 1998 and 1999, the Copa del Rey in 1997 and 1998 and the Cup Winners’ Cup in 1997.

The Blaugrana were also getting the better of rivals Real Madrid in clashes between the two. Figo was a big-game player, and made the difference in these key encounters. He had a key role in his team’s double over Real Madrid in the 1997/98 season – here we see him racing through to set up Giovanni for a dramatic late winner at the Bernabéu.

In the return Clásico at the Camp Nou, Barca romped to a 3-0 victory, Figo scoring one of the finest goals of his career with this left-foooted screamer.

This relationship was to turn sour as Figo demanded a higher wage, claiming that the club undervalued him. Months of speculation over the possibility of a move to Italy passed, but the eventual outcome was far more dramatic. Real Madrid broke the world transfer record, paying £38 million to bring Figo to the Spanish capital and begin the galactico era.

If he wasn’t feeling fully appreciated before, this was about to change; being awarded the Ballon d’Or as Real won the league title in his debut season. Another title win would come in the 2002/03 season, but the greatest moment of Figo’s time at the club was the Champions League win of 2002. Labelled by critics beforehand as the “match of the century”, Madrid faced Barcelona in the semi-final. Figo missed the first leg but featured in the second as Los Merengues won the European Clásico 3-1 aggregate before defeating Bayer Leverkusen 2-1 at Hampden Park.

But while becoming a hero at Madrid, the fans who had idolised him before his move would also make their feelings clear. Most infamous is the Clásico of November 2002, at the Camp Nou. While it was a fairly unremarkable 0-0 draw, it’s memorable for the hostile reception given by Los Cules to Figo; jeering his every touch as well as throwing coins and bottles when he went to take corners. And of course, the pig’s head.

Figo would eventually leave Madrid in 2005, as the galactic project began to fall apart. Moving to Inter, he enjoyed a successful end to his career, making 132 appearances and winning 4 Scudetti. He remains at the San Siro in a backroom role, happy to be away from the country where he caused so much controversy. A truly controversial figure, seen by many as a mercenario, he must at least be remembered as one of the greatest players to have played for either Real or Barca and a key figure in the history of the Clásico.



Plays like...

It’s clear that Figo, as the protagonist of Portugal’s “Golden Generation”, was a huge influence on many wingers such as Real Madrid’s Cristiano Ronaldo. But Ronaldo’s explosive, powerful style is at odds Figo’s more measured approach. Players like Mesut Özil and Andrés Iniesta, primarily creative with a tendency to move into wide positions, seem to mirror Figo’s style better.



Honourable mentions
Or should that be dishonourable mentions? Here are some players who’ve played for both Real Madrid and Barcelona; not all of them, however, have donned both shirts in the Clásico.



Josep Samitier – A colourful figure, who is still Barcelona’s second-highest goalscorer. However, he transferred to Real Madrid in 1932 and went to score three Clásico goals against his former employers. Going on to become a manager then scout for Barcelona, he again defected to Real Madrid and hijacked the Alfredo di Stefano transfer. Still seen as a Barca hero despite his betrayal and his friendship with Franco.



Ricardo Zamora – Legendary Spanish ‘keeper spent three years at Barcelona and six at Real Madrid.



Alfredo di Stefano – One of the greatest players in history and the top scorer in the history of the Clásico with 18 goals. While never being a Barcelona player, he gets a mention for agreeing to sign for Barcelona before being persuaded to join Madrid when arriving in Spain in 1953, a saga that intensified the rivalry between the teams.



Luis Milla – The defensive midfielder came up through Barcelona’s academy and had started to establish himself in the first team. But after a disagreement over his contract renewal, he joined Real Madrid on a free transfer in 1990 and would go on to make over 200 appearances for the Castilian giants.



Gheorghe Hagi – Despite enjoying a good second season with Real Madrid, the Romanian midfielder, was sold to Brescia in 1992. After shining at the 1994 World Cup he went to Barcelona, but didn’t really settle, eventually moving to Turkish giants Galatasaray where he played his best football.



Robert Prosinecki – The Croatian playmaker was something of a journeyman. He spent three years
at Real Madrid at the start of the ‘90s, scoring in a Clásico, but joined Barcelona in 1996 after more travels. He left the Camp Nou after just a year, eventually becoming a cult hero at Portsmouth.



Samuel Eto’o – Barcelona were keen to sign the Cameroonian after he impressed at Real Mallorca, with the small problem that he was co-owned by Real Madrid. However, a large transfer fee meant that Eto’o got his move and went on to be prolific for the Catalans, winning three league titles and two Champions leagues.



Javier Saviola – Impressed as a youngster at Barca, but lost form and favour and failed to make an impact after moving to Madrid on a free transfer.

-Ihsaan Budaly

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El Clásico:The Dream Team vs The Galacticos

An imagining of a match between two famous El Clasico sides. The 1992 European Cup winning Barcelona team, known as “The Dream Team” versus the 2002 Real Madrid team, at the beginning of what is known as the Galactico’s period. Il Fenomeno doesn’t make the side – he signed in late summer 2002. Sadly too, Romario didn’t join until the year after Barcelona’s European Cup triumph.

First up, the team sheets.

Barcelona 1992 (4-2-3-1)

Real Madrid 2002 (4-4-2 Diamond)

Former player Cruyff’s return as manager to the Camp Nou in 1988 was the start of a resurgence in Barcelona’s fortunes, following the relatively disappointing years with El Tel and Luis Aragones in charge. Four La Liga titles in a row (1991-94) and a European Cup triumph helped to make Cruyff Barlecona’s most successful ever manager, until he was recently overtaken by Pep Guardiola. Cruyff’s team combined a core of Basque players  with outstanding foreign signings such as Hristo Stoichkov, Ronald Koeman and Michael Laudrup.

Real Madrid’s Galactico’s would go on to include Englishmen Beckham and Owen, but in 2002 President Florentino Perez had been in control for two years, and had added former Blaugranas hero Luis Figo and Frenchman Zinedine Zidane, breaking transfer fee records each year. In contrast to Barcelona, Real Madrid had a fine European Cup pedigree at the time of their team featured here, in fact Los Merengues had won the UEFA Champions League in 1998 and 2000.

In the 1991/92 season, Barcelona’s Dream Team won La Liga, but failed to beat their El Clasico rivals – both the game at Camp Nou and Santiago Bernabeu finished 1-1. In contrast, the Real Madrid team of 2001/02 finished 3^rd behind Rafa Benitez’s famous Valencia side of Canizares, Ayala, Ruben Baraja and Pablo Aimar, and Deportivo La Coruna. They did of course win the Champions League and with the purchase of Brazilian superstar striker Ronaldo went on to win La Liga in the next season.

The Match Report.

Two legendary teams took to the field at Wembley, the home of football. Barcelona 1992 “The Dream Team”, led out by captain Andoni Zubizarreta; and Real Madrid 2002 “The Galacticos”, captained by Fernando Hierro. A nice touch before the match began – both teams gave each other a guard of honour, clapping their rivals onto the re-laid hallowed turf of the Cathedral of Football.

Soon after, hostilities resumed – a match full of energy, passion, and a fair few frayed tempers. Barcelona prevailed 2-1 courtesy of goals from Hristo Stoichkov and Ronald Koeman, and survived a late onslaught from Real Madrid after being reduced to 10 men for the last 12 minutes. Real piled on the pressure, but couldn’t find the second goal to take it to extra time, after Zidane scored a goal of fabulous quality.

Real Madrid started the more lively of the two. Roberto Carlos spent more time in the opposition half during the first twenty minutes than his own – putting Albert Ferrer under pressure and restricting Goikoetxea’s attacking chances.

Barcelona began to come into it though, Guardiola and Bakero putting some lovely passes together, keeping the ball from Real Madrid. Guardiola in particular characterised his play with simple, short passes which had Real’s midfield chasing shadows.

The first goal came ten minutes before half time. A slip by Luis Figo letting Michael Laudrup onto the ball in a dangerous position, the great Dane advanced on the Real Madrid’s defence, drifting into the space vacated by Roberto Carlos who had sprinted ahead to give Figo an option. A lovely chipped ball between Hierro and Helguera put Stoichkov through who let it bounce before firing a low shot beyond Casillas.

The young ‘keeper made some amends early in the second half, pulling off a series of stunning saves to deny Stoichkov and Bakero, and also a stunning reaction save to keep a Nadal header out from a well worked corner.

Real Madrid then began to play a bit, showing their strengths. Roberto Carlos continued his tireless runs, Makelele snuffing out Barcelona attacks and distributing the ball to his more creative colleagues. The Real Madrid attack had been quiet until this point, but in the 55^th minute they combined to give Zubizarreta more to do than keep himself warm. Zidane outmuscled Bakero and played in Figo with a glorious reverse ball. Quick feet by Figo found him half a yard in the area, his curled shot had Zubizarreta beaten, but the ball agonisingly pinged off the corner of the bar and left post.

Barcelona seemed to take heed of the warning. Applying more pressure through midfield, they began to press higher up the pitch and were rewarded for their belligerence with a second with just over 20 minutes remaining. Another well worked set piece found Koeman  30 yards out. The Real Madrid wall remained static as Laudrup surprised them by playing the ball laterally to the onrushing Koeman who again cemented his reputation for deadly accuracy and power from range. No keeper in the world would’ve kept his shot out; 2-0 Barcelona.

Barcelona didn’t take their foot off the gas though. They continued to play the possession game, frustrating Real Madrid. Helguera in particular began to take out his frustration on opponent’s legs. Although perhaps it was a ploy to bring out the temper of another hot-head on the pitch. In the 78^th minute Stoichkov was brought down once to many times for his liking, and retaliated by raking his studs across the ribs of Helguera when both were on the floor. Helguera received a yellow for the foul, but Stoichkov got his marching orders from referee Pierluigi Collina.

Real Madrid, a man to the good but two goals down, turned up the tempo in the remaining minutes of the game, and it was then Barcelona’s turn to soak up pressure. Five minutes before the end Zidane produced the moment of brilliance his team had been looking for, setting up a grandstand finish. Receiving the ball from Makelele in the centre circle, he played a one-two with Solari, then laid the ball off for Morientes. Morientes found substitute Steve McManaman down the right wing who made the bye-line before chipping a cross to Zidane on the penalty spot. Bringing the ball down with his chest, he executed a perfect Cruyff turn, bamboozling Koeman before hammering a right foot shot into the top corner of the goal.

In the end it wasn’t enough. An injury time effort from Raul was palmed onto the bar and behind, but Zubizarreta’s touch wasn’t spotted by the linesman or referee, who blew for full time. The Dream Team 2; The Galactico’s 1; a match of scintillating football sent the 80,000 capacity crowd home happy. Everyone present in that grand old stadium will be telling people for years “that match was unbelievable”.

You can follow Tom on twitter @ffootballer or visit his blog The Frustrated Footballer